I'd like to take a moment here to say that the original title is "Porn for All or No Porn at All"
author's note:
Constructivism- the theory that people's natures are shaped by their surroundings
Essentialism- the theory that people are inherently a certain way
Western society has recently become hyper-saturated with overt sexual ideology to an unprecedented extent. Beyond the public images, whose themes are suggestive rather than outright graphic, exists the age-old sphere of pornography. With a shift in the tolerated publicity levels of sex, pornography has become not only a “multi-million dollar business” (Tisdale 147), but also available for the first time to a wider audience. As pornographically engendered images and attitudes soak through modern culture, enormous debate has risen regarding the effects of such material. Specifically, the newly assembled and recognized body of feminism has put forth many arguments and counter-arguments over the result of pornographic ideology on the societal conception of womanhood, and on individual women. In her work “Feminism Unmodified: Not a Moral Issue”, conservative feminist Catharine MacKinnon argues and maintains a fully constructivist view. Sallie Tisdale challenges many of MacKinnon’s conclusions in “Talk Dirty To Me: An Intimate Philosophy of Sex” by approaching the matter with a much more liberal viewpoint and a combination of constructivism and essentialism. The patronizing absolutism of the conservative constructivist view denies the chance of using the reality of human sexuality to create a new pornography that incorporates women in its production, and broadens the scope of our cultural images past the stagnant and oppressive stand-bys that have become the hallmarks of the adult entertainment world.
In order to create any practical analysis of the effects of pornography on the well-being of women, it is necessary to define the relevant terms. MacKinnon makes a clear point of separating pornography from obscenity. She articulates that “obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a political practice” (147). In other words, obscenity deals with concepts of good and evil, while pornography is a matter of power versus powerlessness. While obscenity concerns itself with abstraction, McKinnon posits that pornography is concrete in that it creates its own reality. She calls it a form of forced sex based on the “male standpoint” (148), which serves as “the process through which gender inequality becomes socially real” (149). Tisdale, on the other hand, views pornography as a positive contributor to female liberation in the sense that it provides images of sex that is “separated magically from reproduction, marriage, and the heterosexual couple” (157), things that feminists generally consider to be oppressive to women. To Tisdale, political incorrectness is the heart of pornography. “If it’s not outside acceptable conventions of family and culture,” she says, “it’s not porn” (157).
MacKinnon’s constructionist standpoint leads her to the conclusion that the nature of womanhood is completely directed by pornography and that women are forced to “live its lie as reality” (154). She goes so far as to say that “pornography can invent women because it has the power to make its vision into reality, which then passes…for truth”(155). This assertion is challenged by Tisdale’s argument that “it’s not possible to know how viewing pornography affects people…except in limited and suspiciously inadequate ways” (160). However, it seems clear to MacKinnon that the fault lies squarely in men. She directly blames their supposed ‘nature’ for the mistreatment of women in pornography. She accuses men of creating scenes in which women desire abuse, humiliation, and injury, generalizing that “this is erotic to the male point of view” (148). According to MacKinnon, “men’s power over women defines who women can be” (148). To the anachronistic argument that pornography uses people as objects, Tisdale dryly responds, “yes, it does. So much does. Can we choose to be objects in certain situations and not others?” (150). She compares the use of women’s bodies as objects with male professional football players, who are used as objects for “profit, harm, [and] exploitation” (150). Furthermore, she accuses MacKinnon and her contemporaries as treating women as a group that must be “rescued, not respected” (156). Tisdale describes an advertisement depicting a woman lovingly cleaning a toilet that the men in her house have fouled, and asks, “how could the face of a woman in orgasm be more depraved than this?” (153).
Considering their widely differing viewpoints, it is unsurprising that the two authors reach drastically different conclusions on what should be done regarding pornography and its oppressive issues. McKinnon bemoans the erroneous use of the First Amendment to protect pornographic speech, asserting that “the free speech of men silences the free speech of women” (156). She is mainly concerned with “how the harm of pornography is to become visible” (155) given the invisibility of women’s issues in political spheres. Her solution is to suggest the requirement of “an entirely new theory of social causality” (161), backed up by legal standards made enforceable by “[addressing the] fundamental issue – gender inequality – directly” (154). It is necessary from her perspective to reveal the true violation of women inherent in “the same acts both sexes have learned as natural and fulfilling and erotic” (161). In other words, we must tell women they’re being violated because they mistakenly believe they are participating in enjoyable sexual acts due to the pornographic nature of society. Tisdale comes to exactly the reverse conclusion, postulating that an increased female presence in the pornographic world is the true necessity, as “man’s vision of women would begin to change – because he would be looking at real women…he would have to change, he would have no choice” (149-50). In her opinion, the problem with modern pornography is that it is too limited in scope, reusing the same “juvenile assumptions…[and] lack of depth” (157). She suggests that instead of stifling the existing sexual images, as MacKinnon favours, it is necessary to broaden the horizons and allow for the creation of more positive constructions regarding women, homosexuals, and others. She decries the feminist lack of support for “women in porn to create unions and control the means of production” (163), and blames feminism for creating a stigma that “decreases [women’s] ability to assert their own ideas for change” (163).
One great problem I find in MacKinnon’s argument is that she claims that female sexuality is manufactured and defined, but does so on the basis that it conforms with some “natural” sexual inclination of men. Why isn’t it that male “turn-ons” are also considerable as a socially manufactured construct? She says things like “men are turned on by obscenity, including its suppression” (150) as support for her arguments, but appears to be missing the hypocritical nature of this position; she is arguing for constructivism on a foundation of essentialist propaganda. In addition, I find the main premise of her solution to be irretrievably flawed. The suppression of pornographic images is not only a societal impossibility, given that sexuality plays such a central role to human identity, but it also serves to create further ignorance and stagnation of sexual ideology. Besides, as Tisdale puts it, “I can hardly imagine what a police state would be required to make such a thing come about” (154). Tisdale’s approach appeals to me more because it is less absolutist in its careful consideration of both essentialism and constructivism. I find it much easier to agree with a perspective that takes into account both the realities of what constitutes arousal, in either gender, as well as the role that societal moulds play in channelling and shaping these desires. While she essentially agrees with MacKinnon that some change is necessary in the current pornography, I find her quite right in saying that choking off images of female sexuality only adds to the invisibility that women struggle with. Like a knife, pornography is neither inherently helpful nor destructive, but rather can be used to either purpose. Attempting to destroy the knife shuts out the possibility of carving something beautiful with it. This is not to say that the inclusion of women into pornographic production would magically solve everything. Just as men may abuse the medium, so too it is fully probable that some women will further the same tepid and oppressive sexual ideologies. However, pornography created for women by women will set in motion the rejuvenation and authentication of the female sexual experience.
A direct comparison of MacKinnon’s and Tisdale’s vastly differing approaches to the issue of pornography and the oppression of women provides an effective matrix for evaluating the attitudes and considerations requiring scrutiny in this ethical dilemma. This contrast of constructivism and essentialism is best analyzed, in my opinion, by considering the ramifications of each approach and approximating their accuracy based on my personal experience of pornography as an adult female. The stagnation of oppressive cultural ideologies can only become more male-centred and stigmatic if images of female sexuality are repressed, as conservative feminism suggests. In order to fairly deal with the situation and provide women with liberation from male-dominated constructs of female sexuality, it is necessary to put women in positions of authority and power in the production and distribution of pornographic material. Perhaps, then, women will be able to enjoy pornography as men do, without that lingering feeling that we are somehow obligated to feel uncomfortable with what we are seeing.
